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(d) 0.5% for the portion of the sale from
€350,000.01 to €500,000;  
(e) 0.25% for the portion of the sale price
exceeding €500,000.67 
In 2013, Société des Auteurs Dans les Arts 
Graphiques et Plastiques (ADAGP), the French 
collecting society for visual artists, distributed royalties 
to 1840 artists and their estates—44% were living 
artists.68 The French law extends the resale royalty to 
seventy years after the artist’s death.69 ADAGP collected 
over €12.5 million in resale royalties: €8.3 million from 
sales in France and the rest from foreign markets.70 
It is time for the United States to join the 
community of nations on this issue. American artists, 
too, and their families and estates, should be able to 
enjoy the legacies of resale royalties.  
67 2001 Council Directive, supra note 60, at 35.
68 E-mail from Fabienne Gonzalez, Société des Auteurs Dans les
Arts Graphiques et Plastiques, to author (January 15, 2015, 13:42 CST) 
(on file with author). 
69 See Council Directive 93/98, art. 1, § 1, 1993 O.J. (L 290) (EC), 
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?qid=1416675593286&uri=CELEX:31993L0098.
70 E-mail from Fabienne Gonzalez, Société des Auteurs Dans les 
Arts Graphiques et Plastiques, to author (January 15, 2015, 13:42 CST) 
(on file with author). 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1997, I wrote an article 1  on the treatment of 
appropriation artists2 under the Copyright Act of 1976 
(the Act).3 The thrust of the article was that copyright 
law was suppressing appropriation art. 4  This was 
happening because the Act did not recognize the 
circumstances of the late twentieth century, when a 
significant chunk of the aesthetic vocabulary of the day 
was privately owned. 5  Many artists were targeting 
popular culture, but that was becoming difficult to do 
when most of that culture was owned by litigious 
cultural landlords who stood ready to bring copyright 
infringement actions against anyone using their 
“property.” The article predicted that appropriation 
artists would “abandon their art” if some solution was 
not devised.6 The article provided one such solution7 in 
the form of a narrowly tailored copyright privilege 
extending to the creation of “works of visual art” as 
defined in the Copyright Act—works of painting or 
sculpture that are created in single copies or editions of 
not more than 200.8 
My earlier article was written seventeen years ago. 
In this article, I will revisit the circumstances of 
                                                   
1 Niels B. Schaumann, An Artist’s Privilege, 15 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 
249 (1997).  
2 “Appropriation in art and art history refers to the practice of artists 
using pre-existing objects or images in their art with little transformation of 
the original.” Appropriation, TATE, http://www.tate.org.uk/learn/online-
resources/glossary/a/appropriation (last visited Nov. 2, 2014). 
3 See Act for the General Revision of the Copyright Law (Copyright Act 
of 1976), ch. 17, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17 
U.S.C. §§ 101–810 (2012)). 
4 Schaumann, supra note 1, at 249–51. 
5 Id. at 252–54. 
6 Id. at 273. 
7 See id. at 274–80. 
8 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “work of visual art”). 
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appropriation subject artists to see how the law has 
evolved and whether they are freer to create than they 
were in the late 1990s. In particular, although the 
Supreme Court in 1994 clearly sent a signal that 
“transformation” of the copied work would be 
important in fair use cases, 9  this idea had not been 
applied to appropriation art cases. How, then, has 
“transformation” affected appropriation art? Does 
appropriation art still pose a challenge to copyright law? 
Although I will build on my earlier article, I will not 
assume familiarity with it. This article stands on its own. 
Whereas An Artist’s Privilege investigated a number of 
different alternatives to the treatment of appropriation 
art under the Copyright Act, the current article looks 
only at the changes in the fair use doctrine and 
discusses whether those changes would suffice to make 
a privilege like the one suggested in the earlier article 
unnecessary.  
Part I provides some background regarding 
aesthetic vocabulary in the arts, and traces the use of 
appropriated images in the twentieth- and twenty-first 
centuries. Part II discusses the general application of 
copyright law to appropriation art. Part III examines the 
current status of the fair use cases that address 
appropriation art and concludes that the fair use results 
are better than before, largely because of the 
ascendancy of “transformativeness” as an important fair 
use factor. It also concludes, however, that fair use 
remains insufficient to protect appropriation art. 
Finally, Part IV re-proposes a solution—an exception to 
copyright, limited to fine art—grounded in the public 
benefit of dissemination of knowledge and the lack of 
damage to the original author’s economic interest 
resulting from appropriation art. 
                                                   
9 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 572 (1994). 
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II. AESTHETIC VOCABULARY 
Aesthetic vocabulary changes with the times. 
Voluptuous female nudes are no longer a common 
subject of painters; neither are religious allegories. Art 
today is more openly critical of the culture in which it 
arises, and it does so in many cases by referring 
explicitly to that culture. This section will briefly review 
the history of appropriation as an artistic technique.10 
The art historian will no doubt see this as woefully 
inadequate, but for legal purposes it will suffice.  
Beginning in the early twentieth century, artists 
began to take objects from their surroundings for 
incorporation into works of art, for example the 
collages of Picasso and Braques.11 These collages were 
followed by the use of industrially-manufactured 
objects that were complete, stood alone, and were 
identified as art. Marcel Duchamp’s “ready-mades” 
famously included a piece titled “Fountain,” consisting 
of a men’s urinal atop a pedestal, signed “R. Mutt 1917.”12  
The use of objects from the environment was 
continued by the Surrealists. Meret Oppenheim’s Object 
is a cup, saucer, and spoon—covered in the fur of a 
                                                   
10 A similarly brief exposition of this subject can be found on the Tate 
Gallery web site. TATE, supra note 2.  
11 Both artists were responsible for introducing collages, or papiers collés, 
into fine art in 1912. Pablo Picasso used newspaper clippings to create 
forms. See, for example, Bottle of Vieux Marc, Glass, Guitar, and Newspaper, 
which may be viewed at Tate online.  Pablo Picasso, Bottle of Vieux Marc, 
Glass, Guitar, and Newspaper, TATE, 
http://www.tate.org.uk/art/artworks/picasso-bottle-of-vieux-marc-glass-
guitar-and-newspaper-t00414 (last visited Nov. 2, 2014).  
12 Shelley Esaak, Special Exhibition Gallery: Dada at MoMA—New 
York, ABOUT EDUCATION (2014), available at 
http://arthistory.about.com/od/dada/ig/DadaatMoMANewYork/dada
_newyork_07.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2014)(showing an original 
photograph of the work taken by Alfred Stieglitz). 
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Chinese gazelle. 13  Soon, however, artists began to 
appropriate the works of other artists as subject matter, 
rather than pre-existing utilitarian objects. In 1938, 
Joseph Cornell—who had become infatuated with the 
actress Rose Hobart—purchased a print of the B-movie 
East of Borneo featuring the actress, removed all the 
sections of the film in which she did not appear, and 
projected what was left at silent-film speed through a 
blue-tinted lens with a new soundtrack from a record 
album he had purchased. He called this work Rose 
Hobart.14  
Twenty years later, more film works were 
appropriated. The year 1958 saw two works that 
consisted of appropriated images: A Movie, by Bruce 
Connor,15 and the film Cowboy and Indian, by Raphael 
Montanez Ortiz.16  Connor’s film used found footage 
and pre-recorded sounds to present a meditation on 
sex, war, and the nature of the film medium.17 Ortiz cut 
apart footage from a Western film, threw the cut-up 
pieces in a bag, and then randomly pulled out pieces of 
                                                   
13 An image of this work, and its gallery label text, are available at the 
Museum of Modern Art website. Meret Oppenheim, Object, MUSEUM OF 
MODERN ART, 
http://www.moma.org/collection/object.php?object_id=80997 (last visited 
Nov. 2, 2014).  
14  Vivian Sobchak, Nostalgia for a Digital Object: Regrets on the 
Quickening of QuickTime, Nordicom Review 29, 37 (2004), available at 
http://www.nordicom.gu.se/sites/default/files/kapitel-pdf/134_029-
038.pdf. The film Rose Hobart is available on YouTube. Joseph Cornell, 
Rose Hobart, YouTube (July 15, 2012) 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pQxtZlQlTDA.   
15 David Conner Haney, Documentary, Postmodernism, and La Mémoire des 
anges, OFFSCREEN (July 2011) 
http://offscreen.com/view/documentary_postmodernism.   
16 Rocío Aranda-Alvarado, Unmaking: The Work of Raphael Montañez 
Ortiz, JERSEY CITY MUSEUM, (Feb.-Aug. 2007), 
http://centropr.hunter.cuny.edu/sites/default/files/Interview%20with%20O
rtiz.pdf. 
17 Haney, supra note 15.  
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the film and spliced the parts together to create a new 
work.18  
In the 1960s, the Pop Art movement began to 
appropriate images from popular culture. Roy 
Lichtenstein’s Look Mickey,19 painted in 1961, takes an 
image from a Little Golden Book featuring Donald 
Duck.20 Later, Lichtenstein painted images in his comic-
book style based on paintings by Picasso.21 Picasso, too, 
appropriated: in 1957, he painted his Las Meninas 
series—a suite of fifty-eight paintings reinterpreting Las 
Meninas by Diego Velazquez.22 
The 1960s also brought Pop Art icon Andy Warhol, 
whose silkscreened images of flowers on the walls of 
Leo Castelli’s gallery generated what might be the first 
                                                   
18 Aranda-Alvarado, supra note 16, at 33. 
19 An image of the painting appears at the National Gallery of Art 
website. Roy Lichtenstein, Look Mickey, NATIONAL GALLERY OF ART, 
http://www.nga.gov/content/ngaweb/Collection/art-object-page.71479.html 
(last visited Nov. 3, 2014).  
20 An image of the painting may be viewed in the public domain. CARL 
BUETTNER, DONALD DUCK LOST AND FOUND (1960), available at 
http://www.nga.gov/content/dam/ngaweb/Education/learning-
resources/an-eye-for-art/AnEyeforArt-RoyLichtenstein.pdf.  
21 An image of one of the paintings may be viewed at Christie’s website. 
Roy Lichtenstein, Woman with Flowered Hat, CHRISTIE’S 
http://www.christies.com/lotfinder/paintings/roy-lichtenstein-woman-
with-flowered-hat-5684070-details.aspx (last visited Nov. 3, 2014). This 
painting sold for more than $56 million at Christie’s in May 2013. The 
Picasso original, which sold for more than $95 million in 2006, can be 
viewed on Wikipedia. Pablo Picasso, Dora Maar au Chat, WIKIPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dora_Maar_au_Chat (last visited Nov. 3, 
2014).  
22  These paintings may be viewed at BCN.CAT, 
http://www.bcn.cat/museupicasso/swf/en/lacoleccio/meninas/meninas.ht
ml (last visited Nov. 3, 2014); Diego Velazquez, Las Meninas-Picasso, LAS 
MENINAS, http://www.velazquezlasmeninas.com/las-meninas-picasso.html 
(last visited Nov. 3, 2014).  
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lawsuit based on artistic appropriation. 23  Even Roy 
Lichtenstein’s appropriation of Disney characters, noted 
above, did not provoke a lawsuit. The case against 
Warhol was settled out of court, with Warhol agreeing 
to a royalty for future uses of Caulfield’s work.24 Warhol 
also gave Caulfield two of the silkscreened flower 
pieces.25 
At the same time, Elaine Sturtevant was copying the 
works of other artists, meticulously reproducing the 
technique and results obtained by others. It is 
frequently difficult to spot a Sturtevant; her works are 
superb repetitions of the works of others. 26   When 
questioned intensively about his own technique, 
Warhol reportedly said, “I don’t know. Ask Elaine.”27 
Sturtevant herself summed up her purpose by saying, “I 
create vertigo.”28 Although she was creating since the 
                                                   
23  Warhol was sued by Patricia Caulfield, whose copyrighted 
photograph of four poppies Warhol found in an issue of Modern 
Photography. Warhol enlarged the image and had it professionally silk-
screened onto canvases that were then painted in bright, often unrealistic 
colors by Warhol's friends and associates at his studio, “the Factory.” The 
resulting series of approximately 1,000 works, entitled Flowers, were shown 
in the Leo Castelli gallery and eventually licensed as posters. Caulfield 
discovered Warhol's unauthorized use when she came across the posters in 
a New York City bookstore. One of Warhol's biographers claims that 
Caulfield was not concerned about the infringement to her work, but rather 
that she “had been prompted to sue him when she heard that Andy was 
‘rich.’” Emily Meyers, Art on Ice: The Chilling Effect of Copyright on Artistic 
Expression, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 219, 225–26 (2007).  
24 Id. at 226.  
25 Id.  
26  See Andrew Russeth, Sturtevant, Uncompromising Progenitor of 
Appropriation Art, Has Died, N. Y. OBSERVER (May 7, 2014, 9:43 PM), 
http://observer.com/2014/05/sturtevant-uncompromising-progenitor-of-
appropriation-has-died/.   
27 Margalit Fox, Elaine Sturtevant, Who Borrowed Others’ Work Artfully, Is 
Dead at 89, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2014, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/17/arts/design/elaine-sturtevant-
appropriation-artist-is-dead-at-89.html.  
28 Id.  
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1960s, Sturtevant, unlike Warhol, was not sued for 
copying others’ works, although she reportedly 
annoyed Claes Oldenburg severely when she copied his 
Store.29  
By 1975, Richard Prince was re-photographing 
images taken from cigarette advertisements, 30  the 
beginning of a career of appropriation that by 2012 had 
extended to a complete appropriation of the novel The 
Catcher in the Rye, identical in every way to the original 
first edition, except that the author’s name had been 
changed from J.D. Salinger to Richard Prince.31 Along 
the way, Prince created the works shown in his Canal 
Zone exhibition, which prompted a lawsuit from 
photographer Patrick Cariou, thirty-five of whose 
photographs were used in Prince’s exhibition.32  
The 1980s saw the adoption of the term 
“appropriation art” in the art world.33 Sherrie Levine 
photographed the work of other photographers (while 
                                                   
29 Christopher Bagley, Sturtevant: Repeat Offender, W (May 8, 2014, 8:12 
PM), http://www.wmagazine.com/people/2014/05/sturtevant-moma-
retrospective/photos/.  
30 One example from 1989 can be seen at the Metropolitan Museum of 
Art. THOMAS P. CAMPBELL, THE METROPOLITAN MUSEUM ART GUIDE 448 
(Michael Sittenfeld & Robert Weisberg ed., 2012), available at 
http://books.google.com/books?id=3C4AFXFLmZEC (last visited Nov. 2, 
2014); Richard Prince, Untitled (Cowboy), METMUSEUM, 
http://www.metmuseum.org/toah/works-of-art/2000.272 (last visited Nov. 
2, 2014). 
31 Kenneth Goldsmith, Richard Prince’s Latest Act of Appropriation: The 
Catcher in the Rye, POETRY FOUNDATION (Apr. 19, 2012),   
http://www.poetryfoundation.org/harriet/2012/04/richard-princes-latest-
act-of-appropriation-the-catcher-in-the-rye/. 
32 See Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 698 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 
S. Ct. 618, (2013).  
33 See TATE, supra note 2; Sven Lütticken, The Feathers of the Eagle, 36 
NEW LEFT REV. 109, 109 (2005), available at 
http://dspace.ubvu.vu.nl/bitstream/handle/1871/21431/182536.pdf?sequence
=2.  
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scrupulously identifying the originals and 
distinguishing them from her own work).34 Jeff Koons 
took images from popular culture, recreating them in 
sculpture, painting, and collage. 35  He was sued for 
copyright infringement three times in the late 1980s, 
and lost each case. 36 In 2006, Koons finally won a case, 
based on his “transformation” of the appropriated 
work.37  
The foregoing short history demonstrates that the 
practice of appropriating objects and images from the 
world surrounding the artist has a distinguished and 
lengthy pedigree. So common is appropriation in the 
art world that a 2010 exhibition at the New Museum in 
New York, entitled Free, was built “partly around the 
very idea of the borrowing culture.” 38  Nevertheless, 
beginning in 1965 with the lawsuit against Andy 
Warhol,39 copyright infringement cases against artists 
who reuse images have proliferated.  
                                                   
34 See Schaumann, supra note 1, at 250; see also John Carlin, Culture 
Vultures: Artistic Appropriate and Intellectual Property Law Review, 13 COLUM.-
VLA J.L. & ARTS 103, 103–04 (1988); Gerald Marzorati, Art in the (Re)making, 
ARTNEWS, May 1986, at 90, 97. “Copying such images, whether or not for 
artistic purposes, is likely to result in litigation.” Schaumann, supra note 1, at 
254; see, e.g., Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992); United Feature 
Syndicate, Inc. v. Koons, 817 F. Supp. 370 (S.D.N.Y 1993); Campbell v. 
Koons, No. 91 Civ. 6055(RO), 1993 WL 97381, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 1993). 
35 See Schaumann, supra note 1, at 251; Rogers, 960 F.2d at 304–306. 
36 See, e.g., Rogers, 960 F.2d at 301; United Feature Syndicate, Inc, 817 F. 
Supp. at 370; Campbell, 1993 WL 97381, at *1. 
37 Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 246 (2d Cir. 2006) (affirming the 
district court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants on the 
ground that Koons's appropriation of Blanch's photograph was fair use). 
38 Randy Kennedy, Apropos Appropriation, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2012, at 
AR1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/01/arts/design/richard-
prince-lawsuit-focuses-on-limits-of-appropriation.html?pagewanted=all.  
39 See supra notes 23–25. 
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III. COPYRIGHT LAW AND APPROPRIATION ART 
It is the nature of appropriation art that the subject 
matter is copied. 40  When that subject matter is a 
copyrighted work, the artist commits at least one 
infringement under the Copyright Act, and likely 
more.41 This is not something exclusive to the 1976 Act, 
as the (pre-1976) lawsuit against Andy Warhol noted 
above makes clear. However, after the Act became 
effective on January 1, 1978, a new copyright regime 
took hold. The 1976 Act attempted, as nearly as possible, 
to fully allocate the right to engage in every feasible use of 
a copyrighted work to the owner.42 Under this scheme, 
exceptions were narrowly drawn to serve the interests 
of existing users.43 There were few gray areas, and the 
only way in which a user might legally use a 
copyrighted work without permission was under the 
fair use doctrine, codified for the first time in section 
107 of the new Act.44 
Just a few years after the new Act became effective, 
artists were continuing and extending the tradition of 
copying from pre-existing works. By the 1980s, the 
term “appropriation art” came into use and while the art 
was visually similar to the earlier varieties of copied art, 
the context and culture were different. The innocence 
and playfulness of the earlier copying seemed no longer 
to exist: appropriation art had become edgy, self-
                                                   
40 TATE, supra note 2. 
41 At a minimum, they violate the Act’s prohibition against unlawful 
copying. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1). In addition, many appropriation art cases 
include the use of a work as part of the later artist’s work, as well as the 
public display of the work, implicating 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(2) and 106(5). See 
generally Schaumann, supra note 1, at 254–56 nn.19–24. 
42  See JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 37 (Prometheus Books, 
2006). 
43 Id. 
44 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
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conscious, and it seemed (sometimes, at least) 
knowingly to infringe copyright. Consider the Jeff 
Koons’s 1988 Banality show: the title of the show 
identifies the subjects as banal, which is to say, lacking 
utterly in originality.  Copyright, of course, protects 
only original works of authorship. Yet, the artist’s copies 
of the banal works of others were held to infringe 
copyright. 45  Koons’s infringing works were different 
from Roy Lichtenstein’s Look Mickey, which retains a 
genuine innocence despite copying Disney characters. 
When Koons copied cartoon characters, they were 
implicated in sexual activities.46 The controversy this 
generated was hardly accidental: Koons’s Made In 
Heaven show, following immediately in the footsteps of 
the Banality show, contained many works that 
graphically depict Koons and his then-wife, porn star 
Ilona Staller, having sex.47  
Sherrie Levine was another conspicuously 
transgressive artist who became known in the 1980s. 
Her 1980 show, After Walker Evans, featured works she 
created by re-photographing catalog images out of a 
Walker Evans exhibition catalog. She exhibited these 
photographs as her own art. 48  While Jeff Koons was 
                                                   
45 See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 310 (2d Cir. 1992); United Feature 
Syndicate, Inc. v. Koons, 817 F. Supp. 370, 379 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Campbell v. 
Koons, 91 CIV. 6055 (RO), 1993 WL 97381 (S.D.N.Y., Apr. 1, 1993). 
46 See, for example, the artist’s description of his work entitled “Pink 
Panther,” as quoted in a 1992 Taschen Books retrospective of Koons’s work: 
“Pink Panther is about masturbation.” ECKHARD SCHNEIDER ET AL., JEFF 
KOONS 113 (Angelika Muthesius ed.) (1992). 
47 See id. at 124–61; see also Tom Leonard, Porn star La Cicciolina sues ex-
husband Jeff Koons for child support, THE TELEGRAPH, Mar. 27, 2008 available at 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1583034/Porn-star-La-
Cicciolina-sues-ex-husband-Jeff-Koons-for-child-support.html. Although 
the Made in Heaven works were controversial, they were not alleged to 
appropriate from other images or to infringe copyright. 
48  See Biography: Sherry Levine, ARTNET, 
http://www.artnet.com/artists/sherrie-levine/biography (last visited Oct. 28, 
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sued several times, Levine was merely threatened with a 
lawsuit. Eventually, the Walker Evans estate simply 
bought Levine’s works and declined to exhibit them.49 
When I wrote my 1997 article, Koons and Levine 
were the two artists I chose to represent appropriation 
art. Since then, however, appropriation has become 
more, not less, common. Many other artists are copying 
in order to make their artistic statements. The 
Wikipedia entry for “appropriation art” includes a list of 
“notable” artists using appropriation techniques; the list 
contains a hundred names.50 
The fact that there are a hundred or more artists 
who practice appropriation can mean different things 
to different readers. Some might take it as a sign that 
copyright law is irrelevant to the actions of artists, who 
don’t care about copyright if their chosen means of 
expressions leads them toward infringement. Others 
might say the fact that only a hundred artists have been 
brave enough to face litigation (out of all the artists in 
the world) is evidence that copyright has chilled artistic 
expression.  
                                                                                                     
2014). However, the title of the show indicates the provenance of the 
images. Her practice of signifying appropriated subjects by using the word 
“After” in the title has continued throughout her career. Some of her other 
artworks based on appropriation include After Miro; Equivalents: After 
Stieglitz 1-18; After August Sander; and others. See Artworks: Sherry Levine, 
ARTNET, (last visited Nov. 1, 2014). Levine’s work questions traditional 
concepts of originality: where is originality, in a photograph (by Levine) of a 
photograph (by the catalog photographer) of a photograph of people 
posing (by Walker Evans)?  In other words, each of the photographers 
created an image of something that already existed, either in nature or in 
someone else’s photograph. Why are some of these images “original” and 
others not? 
49 See id.  
50  Appropriation (art), WIKIPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Appropriation (art) (last visited Nov. 1, 2014). 
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While the actions of artists may be ambiguous, the 
purpose of copyright is not. It is stated in the 
Constitution: “To promote the progress of Science . . . 
.” 51   The term “Progress of Science” is used in its 
eighteenth-century sense, meaning the dissemination 
or spread of knowledge.52 Copyright accomplishes this 
purpose “by securing for limited Times to Authors . . . 
the exclusive Right to their . . . Writings . . . .”53 Restated, 
then, copyright exists to further the dissemination of 
knowledge, and it does so by providing authors with 
exclusive rights in their original works of authorship. 
Note, however, that the primary purpose (to 
disseminate knowledge) can easily be at odds with the 
secondary purpose (to secure rights to authors). The 
conflict arises because securing rights to authors limits 
dissemination; the requirement of obtaining (and often 
paying for) the right to do something with the author’s 
work implies that such rights will be exercised less often 
than if no permission or payment were required. 
In the absence of any provision expressly exempting 
art from copyright law, how is the tension between the 
primary and secondary purposes of copyright to be 
resolved in the case of appropriation art? The usual 
crucible in which such outcomes are forged is litigation 
under the fair use doctrine. In a fair use case, a user 
asserts the right to use a work without seeking 
                                                   
51 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
52 See, e.g., Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 888 (2012) (“The ‘Progress of 
Science,’petitioners acknowledge, refers broadly to ‘the creation and spread 
of knowledge and learning.’”); see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 
n.18 (2003) (citing Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1, 27 
(S.D.N.Y. 1992)), aff'd, 60 F.3d 913 (C.A.2 1994) (“Accordingly, ‘copyright law 
celebrates the profit motive, recognizing that the incentive to profit from the 
exploitation of copyrights will redound to the public benefit by resulting in 
the proliferation of knowledge . . . . The profit motive is the engine that 
ensures the progress of science.’”). 
53 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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permission or paying a fee; the copyright owner claims 
that such a use is infringement. The user’s case asserts 
the primacy of the dissemination of knowledge or the 
“Progress of Science,” while the copyright owner 
emphasizes the “exclusive Rights” granted by copyright. 
Fair use cases determine, on the facts before the court, 
which purpose shall prevail. 
Fair use is thus a potentially powerful antidote to the 
rights that belong to the copyright owner. Fair use is 
appropriation artists’ best hope for escaping liability. It 
is no surprise, then, that most of the scholarly 
discussion over the application of copyright law to 
appropriation art has focused on the application of the 
fair use doctrine. Indeed, of the various approaches that 
might be used, fair use is the only one that has been 
applied by courts.54 
The next part of this article will consider the rise of 
transformativeness in the law of fair use to see if the 
trend in the cases since 1997 is less oppressive to art 
than it was previously. If so, then perhaps the 
difficulties besetting appropriation artists have been 
mitigated.  
IV. FAIR USE AND APPROPRIATION ART 
The law of fair use was first codified in the United 
States when the Copyright Act of 1976 was passed. 
Section 107 lays out the defense:  
Notwithstanding the provisions of 
sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a 
copyrighted work, including such use by 
                                                   
54 My 1997 article described some other possibilities, some of which 
had been suggested by contemporary commentators, including 
compulsory license and the unlikely expedient of abandoning copyright 
altogether. See Schaumann, supra note 1, at 271–75. 
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reproduction in copies or phonorecords 
or by any other means specified by that 
section, for purposes such as criticism, 
comment, news reporting, teaching 
(including multiple copies for classroom 
use), scholarship, or research, is not an 
infringement of copyright. In 
determining whether the use made of a 
work in any particular case is a fair use 
the factors to be considered shall 
include— 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, 
including whether such use is of a 
commercial nature or is for nonprofit 
educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the 
portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential 
market for or value of the copyrighted 
work.55 
Although the four factors listed are non-exclusive, 
each must be included in the fair use analysis.56 In the 
case law interpreting section 107, two factors stand out 
as the most important: the purpose and character of the 
use (factor one),57 and the market impact of the use on 
                                                   
55 Copyright Act of 1976, ch. 17, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–810 (2012)). 
56 Id. (“[T]he factors to be considered shall include . . . .”) (emphasis 
added). In other words, consideration of the factors stated in section 107 is 
mandatory (“shall”); also, the factors are non-exclusive (“include”). 
57 See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 589 (1994); 
Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 496 (1984) 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW 
OF COPYRIGHT 68 (Columbia University Press 1967); Pierre Leval, Toward a 
Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1111 (1990). 
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the market for the copied work (factor four).58 A heavy 
market impact (for example, the defendant selling her 
works in direct competition with the plaintiff) tends to 
weigh against fair use; light or no impact, in favor of fair 
use.59 
A. Purpose and Character of the Use 
The first of the key factors—the “purpose and 
character” of the use—has evolved over the Act’s first 
thirty-six years.60  The Act states that in determining 
“purpose and character,” a court must address “whether 
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit 
educational purposes.” 61  Predictably, then, the early 
cases focused on whether the use was commercial or 
not.62  
But the purpose and character of the use can 
obviously be more complicated than simply whether 
the use is commercial or not. In 1990, then-District 
Judge Pierre N. Leval wrote an article in the Harvard 
Law Review that dynamited the notion that the purpose 
                                                   
58 See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 590–94; Harper & Row 
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985) (“This . . . factor is 
undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use.”); Salinger v. 
Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 99 (2d Cir. 1997); Leval, supra note 57. 
59 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 471 U.S. at 603.  
60 See An Act for the General Revision of the Copyright Law, Pub. L. 
No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976). The Copyright Act of 1976 became effective 
in 1978, 36 years before this article was written. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 107(1) (West, 
Westlaw through 2014).  
61 17 U.S.C.A. § 107(1).  
62 See Harper & Row Publishers., Inc., 471 U.S. at 562 (“The fact that a 
publication was commercial as opposed to nonprofit is a separate factor 
that tends to weigh against a finding of fair use.” ); Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 451 
(“[E]very commercial use . . . is presumptively . . . unfair”). Ten years after 
Sony, however, the Court in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose noted that “the mere fact 
that a use is educational and not for profit does not insulate it from a 
finding of infringement, any more than the commercial character of a use 
bars a finding of fairness.” 510 U.S. at 584. 
 
137 FAIR USE AND APPROPRIATION ART  [6:121 2015]               
 
and character of the use was mostly about 
commerciality.63 Leval’s seminal article argued instead 
that analysis of the purpose and character of the use 
should focus on whether the use was transformative. By 
transforming the prior work, the later artist adds 
something creative, which justifies the copying.64 
Judge Leval’s article laid the foundation for the 
analysis of transformation in fair use. But it was the 
Supreme Court’s explicit approval in Campbell 65  that 
transformed Leval’s idea into law.66 The Campbell court 
described the purpose of analysis under the first fair use 
factor as determining “whether the new work merely 
‘supersede[s] the objects’ of the original creation,”67 or 
whether the use “adds something new, with a different 
purpose or different character, altering the first with 
new expression, meaning, or message . . . in other 
words, whether and to what extent the new work is 
‘transformative.’”68 After Campbell, transformation was 
at the heart of fair use. 
How does a court determine whether a use is 
transformative? One obvious approach is to assess the 
changes made to the original work by the secondary 
                                                   
63 Leval, supra note 57, at 1116 n.53 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (1982))(“The 
interpretation of the first factor is complicated by the mention in the statute 
of a distinction based on ‘whether such use is of a commercial nature or is 
for nonprofit educational purposes.’ One should not exaggerate the 
importance of this distinction.”).  
64 See id. at 1111. 
65 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 572 (1994) (“I 
believe the answer to the question of justification [of fair use] turns 
primarily on whether, and to what extent, the challenged use is 
transformative. The use must be product and must employ the quoted 
matter in a different manner or for a different purpose from the original.”).  
66 Id. at 579. 
67 Id. (quoting Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) 
(No. 4,901)). 
68 Id. (citing Leval, supra note 57, at 1111).  
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user.69 But courts have also considered the context in 
which the original work appears in the secondary 
work.70 More broadly, the “composition, presentation, 
scale, color palette, and media” of the secondary work, 
as well as its “expressive nature”71 (compared with the 
original) could be seen as transformative.  
Most broadly, each author’s purpose in creating 
work is important to determining transformation, and 
thus, fair use. 72  Even if the second work is not 
transformative, the use may be fair if the author’s 
purpose is transformative. Thus, the creation of images 
much smaller than the originals (“thumbnails”) used for 
internet navigation, but not otherwise transformative, 
has been found to be a fair use of the original works.73 
Transformation has also influenced the way in 
which courts approach other aspects of the defendant’s 
use. For example, transformation can mitigate the 
negative impact of a commercial use.74 On the other 
hand, lack of transformation may have the opposite 
effect, increasing the weight given to such evidence.75 
                                                   
69 E.g., Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 253 (2d Cir. 2006); Kienitz v. 
Sconnie Nation LLC, 965 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1051 (W.D. Wis. 2013), aff’d on 
other grounds, 766 F.3d 756 (7th Cir. 2014). 
70 Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 801 (9th Cir. 
2003). 
71 Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 706 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. 
Ct. 618, (2013). 
72 Blanch , 467 F.3d at 253; Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley 
Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 706 (2d Cir. 2006); Warner Bros. v. RDR Books, 575 F. 
Supp. 513, 539 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
73 See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1168 (9th Cir. 
2007); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 822 (9th Cir. 2003).  
74 See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1271 (11th 
Cir. 2001).  
75 See On Davis v. The Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 175 (2d Cir. 2001). 
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Important as it is, however, transformation has not 
superseded the other fair use factors. 76 It is just one 
aspect, albeit the most important aspect, of the first 
factor (the “purpose and character of the use”).77 The 
“purpose and character of the use” also depends on 
whether the use is commercial or for nonprofit 
educational purposes, in bad faith, or parody.78 Parody 
holds a privileged status among kinds of use because 
permission to create parodies is rarely given, and they 
are frequently created for profit, hence commercial.79 
Before the rise of transformativeness, defendants often 
claimed that their work was a parody in an attempt to 
escape sanctions in a copyright case.80 Thus, in the first 
infringement lawsuits against Jeff Koons, which took 
place before transformation was widely acknowledged 
as an important element, Koons claimed that his work 
was parody, as that was the clearest route to winning a 
fair use case for the defendant. 81 For Koons, the parody 
                                                   
76 See id. at 174 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 
Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“Although 
such transformative use is not absolutely necessary for a finding of fair use, 
the goal of copyright, to promote science and the arts, is generally 
furthered by the creation of transformative works.”). 
77 See id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 107(1)) (“The heart of the fair use inquiry is 
into the first specified statutory factor identified as ‘the purpose and 
character of the use.’”). 
78 Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 309 (2d Cir. 1992). 
79  See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 596–600 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in the opinion emphasized that 
a legitimate parody must target or comment on the original work, using 
humor. Id. at 597. It is not enough that the work use the original to 
comment on things other than the original, for example society at large or 
the genre of art to which the original belongs. Id. at 599. Kennedy 
characterized such broader works as “satire,” rather than “parody,” and 
found them less deserving of fair use because the need to copy is less than it 
is when creating a parody. Id. at 597. 
80 See, e.g., Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 
1980). 
81 See generally Rogers v. Koons, 751 F. Supp. 474 (1990). 
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defense was conspicuously unsuccessful.82 Nevertheless, 
parody is still mentioned in appropriation art cases, 
usually in conjunction with transformation.83 
B. Nature of the Copyrighted Work 
The second factor under section 107 is the nature of 
the copyrighted (that is, the copied) 84  work. 85  Courts 
generally consider whether the copied work is a work of 
imagination or the arts (which cuts against fair use), or 
whether it is more fact-based (which tends to cut in 
favor of fair use).86 Imaginative and artistic works are 
closer to the core of intended copyright protection than 
fact-based works, with the consequence that fair use is 
more difficult to establish when the former works are 
copied.87  
Many works of appropriation art copy expressive 
works, which are close to the core of copyright 
protection.  We might expect that courts would weigh 
that factor against fair use in appropriation art cases, 
and so they did, before Campbell.88 As transformation 
has become a crucial concept in fair use, however, the 
                                                   
82 See Rogers, 960 F.2d at 310; United Feature Syndicate, Inc. v. Koons, 
817 F.Supp. 370, 379 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Campbell v. Koons, 91 CIV. 6055 (RO)), 
1993 WL 97381 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 1993). 
83 This was the case in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose. 510 U.S. at 599; see also 
Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Productions, 353 F.3d 792, 803 (9th Cir. 
2003); Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 965 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1052 (W.D. 
Wis. 2013), aff’d, 766 F.3d 756 (7th Cir. 2014). 
84 The Act uses the term “the copyrighted work” to refer to the work 
from which the user copied. The work to which the user copied is simply 
referred to as the “use.” If the use is fair, then both works are copyrighted. 
85 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (2012). 
86 See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. 569. 
87 Id. at 586 (Souter, J., majority opinion). The distinction is of less use 
in a parody case, as parodies seem inevitably to “copy publicly known, 
expressive works.” Id. 
88 See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 308 (2d Cir. 1992); United Feature 
Syndicate, Inc. v. Koons 817 F. Supp. 370, 380 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). 
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significance of the second factor—the nature of the 
copyrighted work—seemed to decline. The Second 
Circuit has held that when the use is transformative, the 
second factor will not be given much weight. 89  The 
Ninth Circuit has taken this a step further and held that 
“the more transformative the new work, the less will be 
the significance of other factors.”90 The Second Circuit’s 
recent appropriation art case, Cariou v. Prince, is in 
accord.91 
C. Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used 
The third statutory fair use factor—the amount and 
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole—disfavors extensive 
copying and favors uses that appropriate relatively little 
from their sources. No court has ever attempted a 
bright-line rule about how much can be taken. It is 
clear, though, that “how much” depends on “what for”—
that is, how much may be taken depends on the use to 
be made of the materials (which is factor one).92 The 
artist is not limited to taking only what is necessary.93 
The Supreme Court has found that copying an entire 
work was fair use when the use consisted of videotaping 
broadcast television programs for home, non-
                                                   
89 Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 708 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 
618 (2013); On Davis v. The Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 175 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(finding that even under the best of circumstances, the second factor was 
“rarely determinative.”). 
90 Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170, 1176 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 579); see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. 
at 586 (A similar de-emphasis of this factor has happened in parody cases, 
in which the second factor is not weighed heavily because “parodies almost 
invariably copy publicly known, expressive works.”). 
91 714 F.3d 694, 708 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 618 (2013) 
(quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 579). 
92 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 589. 
93 Id. at 588. 
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commercial use,94 but all other things being equal, the 
more that is copied, the less likely a finding of fair use.95 
Like the other factors, the third factor seems to have 
diminished in importance with the ascendancy of 
“transformation” in fair use analysis. 96  The inquiry 
regarding “transformation” may have completely 
subsumed this factor, much as it appears to have 
subsumed the second factor. That is, if the use is highly 
transformative, the fact that a lot was copied from the 
original work will not deter a finding of fair use; in fact, 
sufficient transformation has led some courts to 
conclude that this factor weighed in favor of fair use—
even when the whole underlying work has been 
copied.97  
D. Effect of the Use Upon the Potential Market 
In 1985, the Supreme Court stated that this factor 
was “undoubtedly the single most important element of 
fair use.”98 It requires courts to consider not only the 
extent of market harm caused by the particular actions 
of the alleged infringer, but also “whether unrestricted 
and widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by the 
                                                   
94 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 496 
(1984). 
95 See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 564 
(1985); On Davis v. The Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 175 (2d Cir. 2001); Rogers v. 
Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 311 (2d Cir. 1992); United Feature Syndicate, Inc. v. 
Koons, 817 F. Supp. 370, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). But see Blanch v. Koons, 467 
F.3d 244, 246, 259 (2d Cir. 2006) (copying entire work does not rule out fair 
use). 
96 The Second and Ninth Circuits have said the importance of the 
other factors declines when transformation is found. See supra text 
accompanying notes 86-93.  
97 Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 618 
(2013); Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605 (2d 
Cir. 2006); Mattell, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 
2003). 
98 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc.., 471 U.S. at 566. 
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defendant . . . would result in a substantially adverse 
impact on the potential market” for the original.99 The 
kind of market harm cognizable under this factor is the 
harm caused by the new work’s substitution for the old 
work in the market. 100  It is not the suppression of 
demand for the original work that matters, it is 
usurpation of the demand for the original work.101 
Impact on the market for derivative works may also 
be considered. Courts have not been very consistent in 
the analysis of derivative works in this regard.102 Some 
courts, taking their cue from the cases before them, 
simply state that it is obviously possible that someone 
else might seek to do the very thing done by the 
defendant but in exchange for payment of a license 
fee.103 This kind of judicial speculation inevitably leads 
to the conclusion that the fourth factor cuts against fair 
use—one can always imagine the defendant paying for 
her use. However, when there is evidence of a market 
for derivative works—similar to the one created by the 
defendant—and that market would be adversely 
affected if the derivative use were to become 
widespread, then a market impact can be shown.104 
                                                   
99 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994) (quoting 3 M. 
NIMMER & D. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §13.05 (1993)). 
100 Id. at 570–71.  
101 Id. (finding that most parodies easily pass muster because it is a rare 
parody that can substitute for the original in the marketplace). But see 
Benny v. Loew’s, Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956) (stating a concern that a 
parody of the movie Gas Light might adversely impact the market for the 
movie—although this case preceded the 1976 Act, and therefore did not 
consider the factors provided therein). 
102 1 Howard B. Abrams, The Law of Copyright § 5:171 (2014).  
103 See, e.g., Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 312 (2d Cir. 1992).  
104 Compare United Feature Syndicate, Inc. v. Koons, 817 F. Supp. 370 
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) (market for sculptures in the shape of a cartoon dog 
plausible) with Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792 (9th 
Cir. 2003) (market for “adult-oriented artistic photographs of Barbie” doll 
not plausible). 
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In today’s market for appropriation art, impact on 
the plaintiff’s market is usually negligible.  Although 
one could always speculate that a third party might 
offer a fee in exchange for the right to create a 
derivative work like the defendant’s, in the absence of 
such a market or plans to create such a market, a court 
should ignore such speculation.  Moreover, as a 
practical matter, the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s 
works are often not sold in the same market.105 Hence, 
the defendant’s work cannot substitute for the 
plaintiff’s. When the audiences, the purchasers, and the 
prices are different for the two works, it is unlikely that 
there would be a market impact on the plaintiff.106 But, 
because one can imagine copying that does not match 
this description, analysis of the market impact of the 
copying continues to be important in appropriation art 
cases.107 
V. MODEST PROPOSAL 
The fair use landscape has been transformed by 
transformation. The rise of transformation analysis, 
based on Judge Leval’s article, is nothing short of 
remarkable. It has affected fair use in nearly every 
context in which fair use can be found. 108  When 
                                                   
105 See e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 
(1985); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).  
106 See Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 708–09 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 
134 S. Ct. 618 (2013).  
107  For example, someone might copy a piece of popular, mass-
produced art, and sell a large number of copies at about the same price as 
the original. In such a case, the fact that the copies might be called “art” 
should not shield the user from a claim of infringement.  The 
appropriation art cases to date, however, involve what we might think of as 
“gallery art” and do not involve mass production of copies. 
108 Not every fair use case addresses transformation. A study of fair use 
judicial opinions up to 2005 found that, after Campbell, more than 41% of 
district court opinions, and nearly 19% of circuit court opinions, did not 
mention transformation. See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. 
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transformation is found, the outcome is nearly always a 
finding of fair use.109 
We would expect, then, that appropriation art has 
benefited from the addition of transformation to the 
fair use analysis. Indeed, it has: the appropriation art 
cases won by the defendant (i.e., the artist) since 
Campbell were won because of the defendant’s 
“transformation” of the underlying work.110 That must 
be seen as progress: Pre-Campbell, no appropriation 
artist had won a case, while post-Campbell there have to 
date been three wins for appropriation art.111 
Even with transformation, however, fair use is no 
panacea for appropriation artists. To be sure, most 
appropriation art strives to be transformative. It seeks to 
evoke a different response in the viewer than did the 
original. But, judges can be unpredictable; they might 
not find the work to be transformative, or even insert 
some other limit—for example that the degree of 
copying exceeded the judge’s notion of what is 
necessary for the artist’s purpose, even if the use is 
transformative.112 
                                                                                                     
Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978-2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 604–05 (2008). 
Nearly 37% of the 68 post-Campbell opinions finding fair use did not 
mention transformation. See id. at 605. The analyzed cases are current only 
through 2005, however, and it is possible that the cases since then have 
increasingly taken up the idea of transformation. 
109 See Beebe, supra note 108, at 606. 
110 See Cariou, 714 F.3d at 710; Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 253, 256–
57, 259 (2d Cir. 2006); Mattel, 353 F.3d at 806, 811. 
111 See, e.g., Cariou, 714 F.3d 694; Blanch, 467 F.3d 244; Mattel, 353 F.3d 
792. 
112 E.g., Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513, 544 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“A finding of verbatim copying in excess of what is 
reasonably necessary diminishes a finding of a transformative use.”). The 
idea that a judge, lacking any training, experience, or other qualification, 
would second-guess what was “necessary” to achieve the artist’s purpose is 
dismaying, and disregards Justice Holmes’ famous admonishment that “[i]t 
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Worse yet for the artist, fair use is an affirmative 
defense,113 which can be established only by litigating 
the question of infringement. It is usually litigated after 
the plaintiff has made at least a prima facie case of 
infringement because if infringement cannot be 
established, there is no need for an affirmative 
defense. 114  From an academic perspective, this may 
seem to pose no problem. After all, judicial opinions are 
an important component of the law that we study. But, 
a practitioner should immediately see the problem: 
copyright litigation is expensive. 115 Telling artists that 
they have the right to make fair use of others’ works as 
long as they are willing to litigate the matter is telling 
them that they have all the rights they can afford to 
buy. To allocate the right to create art according to the 
financial resources of the artist is extravagantly 
protective of existing work at the expense of new work.  
The public interest, too, is damaged by applying 
copyright law to suppress appropriation art. 116 
Copyright’s primary purpose is to increase access to 
copyrighted works.117 Secondarily, it creates incentives 
for authors to create.118 If an author’s incentives are not 
damaged by a use, then, all other things being equal, 
copyright should not prohibit the use. 119  Yet, the 
                                                                                                     
would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to 
constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, 
outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.” Bleistein v. Donaldson 
Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903). 
113 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
114 See, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). 
115  Professor Litman refers to it as “hideously expensive.” JESSICA 
LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 183 (Prometheus Books 2001). 
116 See Schaumann, supra note 1, at 263–65. 
117 Id. at 263. 
118 Id. at 260. 
119 Id. at 264 
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mechanism for balancing those interests, fair use, is so 
costly that for artists it is inadequate.  
A solution exists that would allow a court to limit the 
damage to the public interest without damaging the 
authors’ incentive. It is both workable and practical. Of 
course, it would be opposed, but even the opponents 
would find it hard to argue that it would cause harm.120  
Courts could accomplish this by recognizing that a 
use that fits the definition of a “work of visual art,” as 
defined in the Copyright Act,121  is highly likely to be a 
fair use. The court would evaluate transformativeness, 
but also should look at harm to the market. In this 
regard, it is hard to imagine a work of visual art 
                                                   
120 One fear might be that such a proposal could lead to an industry of 
so-called “artists” making “appropriation art” based on high-value existing 
works, selling the copies as if they were the originals. In other words, 
favoring appropriation art might promote widespread art fraud. But, the art 
world is already familiar with the problem of fraud, and it is a criminal 
matter. Any connection between copyright rules and art fraud is pure 
speculation.  For their part, copyright owners might prefer that all uses of 
their works, whether harmful or not, be left to their discretion. But the 
question is not which rule copyright owners would favor; rather, it is which 
rule is most in the public interest. 
121  A “work of visual art” is (1) a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture, 
existing in a single copy, in a limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are 
signed and consecutively numbered by the author, or, in the case of a 
sculpture, in multiple cast, carved, or fabricated sculptures of 200 or fewer 
that are consecutively numbered by the author and bear the signature or 
other identifying mark of the author; or (2) a still photographic image 
produced for exhibition purposes only, existing in a single copy that is 
signed by the author, or in a limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are 
signed and consecutively numbered by the author. A work of visual art 
does not include—(A)(i) any poster, map, globe, chart, technical drawing, 
diagram, model, applied art, motion picture or other audiovisual work, 
book, magazine, newspaper, periodical, data base, electronic information 
service, electronic publication, or similar publication; (ii) any 
merchandising item or advertising, promotional, descriptive, covering, or 
packaging material or container; (iii) any portion or part of any item 
described in clause (i) or (ii); (B) any work made for hire; or (C) any work 
not subject to copyright protection under this title. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
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harming the market for more commercialized works 
because “works of visual art” can exist only in two 
hundred or fewer copies, signed and consecutively 
numbered. The market for such works is relatively 
small, and it consists of purchasers who are generally 
sophisticated and knowledgeable about what they are 
purchasing. Buyers in this market are familiar with the 
practice of selling copies of works; they are called 
“reproductions.” There are generally at least two 
differences between a reproduction and a work of 
appropriation art: First, appropriation art itself is 
attributed to an artist, different from the artist who 
created the original work, whereas reproductions are 
uncredited. Second, the intention of the appropriation 
artist is different from that of the creator of the original 
work, while reproductions seek to simulate the presence 
of the original work. Attribution is enough to take care 
of most of the potential problems that copying might 
create. For example, Sherri Levine’s photographs of 
photographs taken by Edward Weston would not 
compete in the art market with the Weston originals: 
Levine’s practice of naming those works After Edward 
Weston and signing her works would take care of that.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
Appropriation art is a legitimate and long-standing 
art form practiced by many twentieth- and twenty-first 
century artists. Copyright law, which is intended to 
promote access to creative works, has struggled to come 
to grips with appropriation art because this kind of art 
uses preexisting works as its subject material; it 
comments on culture using the icons of culture.  
Because appropriation art copies without the 
permission of the copyright holder, copyright law tends 
to sweep it into the category of infringement. However, 
unlike most copying, appropriation art does not raise 
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the problems of unauthorized exploitation and 
usurpation of the market for the original.  
A relatively easy solution is available. Courts should 
recognize the legitimacy of appropriation art as an 
artistic practice and take account of the lack of danger 
to existing art markets posed by appropriation artists, as 
long as the copying takes the form of a “work of visual 
art” as defined in the Copyright Act. The common 
characteristics of such works, described in this 
definition, are enough to assure that no significant 
harm can result from the practice. That lack of harm 
together with the primary purpose of copyright—to 
increase access to creative works—are enough to suggest 
that appropriation artists should win all or nearly all the 
infringement cases brought against them. 
